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Abstract: The aim of this essay is to examine an aspect of Par-
menides’ poem which is often overlooked: the psychological 
grounds Parmenides uses to construct his view. While it is widely 
recognized by scholars that following Parmenides’ view requires 
addressing mental activity, i.e. both the possibility of thinking 
the truth, as well as thinking along the wrong path that mortals 
follow, a closer examination of the psychological assumptions 
involved have, to my knowledge, not yet been attempted. 
I argue that by identifying and analyzing the psychological vo-
cabulary in his poem, it is revealed that Parmenides was a keen 
observer of human mental behavior. Through these psycho-
logical (perhaps “cognitivist,” following some recent categories) 
observations of thought processes, Parmenides gains insight 
into the structure of thought itself. The outcome of this inquiry 
reveals three notable conclusions: First, the poem contains a 
remarkably extensive use of strictly psychological vocabulary. 
Second, the presence of this psychological material and the lack 
of scholarly attention to it means there is a significant aspect 
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of Parmenides intellectual legacy that remains unexplored—
Parmenides as psychologist, keen observer of human mental 
behavior.  Furthermore, the recognition of this material helps 
shed important light on Parmenides’ philosophical message.
Ultimately, I intend to provide an exhaustive treatment of Par-
menides’ psychological language, which requires close exami-
nation of DK B 1, 2, 6, and 7.  Due to spatial constraints, I have 
divided the inquiry into two parts, and will only address DK 
1-2 below.
Keywords: Parmenides, Eleaticism, Presocratics, ancient epis-
temology, ancient psychology.
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The presence and importance of psychological lan-
guage in Parmenides poem has been largely overlooked 
by modern scholarship.1  While it is widely recognized 
by scholars that following Parmenides’ view requires 
addressing mental activity, i.e. the possibility of think-
ing the truth and the wrong path mortals follow, a clos-
er examination of the psychological assumptions in-
volved have, to my knowledge, not yet been attempted.
Prior to proceeding further, it is important to clar-
ify my use of the term ‘psychology’ and its cognates 
in this context.  Here, I employ the modern scientific 
meaning—i.e. “study of mind”—rather than the more 
common ancient meaning of “soul” (one of the many 
possible translations of ψῡχή).  More precisely, by 
“psychology,” I mean “the science of the nature, func-
tions and phenomena of the human mind’, exactly 
as found in the first definition of the Oxford English 
Dictionary (Oxford English Dictionary, 2009). Prop-
erly speaking, scientific “psychology” only arises in 
the 19th century and consolidates in the 20th century. 
Therefore, it would not be possible for any examina-
tion of Parmenides from this perspective to precede 
the beginning of the 20th century.  However, after that 
point, and the multiplication of disciplines in cogni-
tive inquiry — from Neuroscience to Social Psychology 
and the Philosophy of Mind — such treatments could 
be expected.
However, the application of such theoretical ap-
proaches has not yet been retroactively applied to 
ancient thought beyond a few notes in texts on the 
History of Psychology. I aim to correct this over-
sight here, as I believe these aspects provide vital 
keys to fully understanding Parmenides’ view. By 
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closely examining the psychological language in 
Parmenides’ poem, he is revealed to be a keen ob-
server of the nature, functions, and behavior of the 
human mind—observations upon which he grounds 
his entire view 2. Thus, in these pages, I would like to 
provide evidence suggesting how Parmenides’ text 
demonstrates that he was a keen observer of the na-
ture, functions and phenomena of the human mind; 
and, from this, offer some suggestions on how his 
psychological observations influenced his philo-
sophical views3.
Fragment 1
DK 1.1-27:  The Philosopher-Youth’s Journey. In 
the first 27 verses of fragment 1, Parmenides care-
fully narrates the trip of a young disciple, or kouros4, 
to the meeting of an anonymous goddess, who will 
provide a didactic program for him to follow with his 
mind. The chosen language, setting, and actions for 
this whole section are entirely mythical.  The right 
interpretation, or even the most likely interpretation 
of this part of the proem, is a highly-contested mat-
ter amongst scholars, and I do not wish to engage 
in that far-ranging discussion here, nor review the 
literature, but to focus solely on the presence of of 
psychological language and its relevance5. Outside of 
DK 1.1, there is no reference to any psychological as-
pect in these lines, unless we want to understand the 
entire journey as an allegory of some kind of mental 
process, as Sextus Empiricus did6. Therefore, here I 
focus solely DK 1.1, and how the emphasis of placing 
the psychologically-charged term θυμὸς in the first 
line might contribute to our understanding of the 
youth’s overall journey:  
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ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι,
Given its early placement in the poem, the word 
θυμὸς seems to be the key for following the didactic 
course that Parmenides, through the teachings of-
fered by the goddess, offers to his audience. In this 
line, Mares lead the young disciple as far as the θυμὸς 
can take him. Thus, the youth’s θυμὸς carries him 
beyond the normal reach of mortals, into the divine 
realm, and then into the mental realm alone. But, 
what should we take θυμὸς to mean?  
θυμὸς has a great semantic field already in Homer, 
where it means “soul” or “spirit” as principle of life, 
feeling7 and thought8. Sextus Empiricus is our sole 
source for these lines in Parmenides, and in his 
paraphrased commentary, he understands it simi-
larly to the Homeric usage and it is not necessary 
to follow Sextus and impute this interpretation to 
θυμὸς here.  
Rather, in Parmenides’ Proem, the reader finds 
an introduction to the general character of his work 
with colorful, resounding9, and dynamic images, pre-
paring the audience to listen to the goddess with the 
right mental disposition of attention10.  Here, θυμὸς is 
strongly poetic and undetermined, in a way that the 
audience can understand it more subjectively than ob-
jectively. On the grounds of the close relationship of 
this term to mental activity in Parmenides’ text, this 
inquiry proceeds from the hypothesis that θυμὸς has 
the sense of “mind,” and the mental activity arising 
from it.
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Assuming that θυμὸς should be identified with 
“mind” rather than “soul”, its position in the first 
verse should alert us that the main topic of the poem 
is the mind. It is the mind (in the wider meaning 
of human capacity of imagination, comprehension, 
and knowledge) that is preparing itself for the great 
adventure to the limits of the mortal word—and be-
yond—in order to discover the most fundamental 
truths, ordinarily known only to divine agents like the 
goddess, and the wisest of men who have followed the 
correct path under her guidance.
The description seems to imply that the mind, or 
mental activity, is closely related to knowledge, and that 
in conjunction with an act of will (symbolized by the 
mares), ready to spring forward along the hard journey 
towards the attainment of knowledge. For, after the 
meticulous description of the physical journey of the 
chariot to meet the didactic goddess concludes, the 
journey of the mind itself (as outlined by the goddess 
in 1.28-32) continues without physical motion. 
First, paths for thought alone are considered, and 
the one that is proper followed—a path upon which 
it is alone possible to find that kind of Persuasion 
that accompanies the truth. Having followed this 
path to conclusion, the youth then embarks upon 
a mental journey along the paths mortals normally 
follow, which leads to descriptions of the origin and 
activities of:  divine stars, ethereal skies, Eros, men 
and women, etc. While it is clear that the journey 
along the path of Persuasion could not be physically 
accomplished, this would seem possible for (at least 
much of) the cosmological descriptions offered in 
Opinion. Thus, it is remarkable that Parmenides 
does not describe this journey as a physical passage 
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of the young apprentice through physical places, 
paralleling the Proem.  Rather, it is truly a journey of 
the mind — i.e. it consists of the mental examination 
of theories about the cosmological, the biological 
and also the psychological worlds, rather than 
any empirical observation. Thus, the overarching 
meaning of DK 1.1-27 makes clear that the poem of 
Parmenides is a poem of the mind, by the mind, and 
about the mind.  Again, as 1.1-27 contain no further 
psychological terms, I now turn to the speech of 
the goddess, at which point Parmenides completely 
changes the manner of presentation.  
The Learning Program, DK B 1.28-30. From 
the beginning of the goddess’ speech, the mythical 
language and imagery is abandoned (save her own 
mythical existence), and poetical indetermination 
gives place to a more precise technical language, in 
spite of the great difficulties that Parmenides faces 
in expressing new notions with extant vocabulary. 
In these lines, the goddess receives the kouros and, 
after offering some comforting words, she says:
…χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.
She says that he must learn (πυθέσθαι)11 everything: 
on one side, the unshaken ἦτορ of the εὐκυκλέος truth, 
and on the other side the opinions of mortals, in which 
there is no true trust. I have left two words in Greek 
because we need to watch them closely. However, first 
we need to make clear the general meaning of the 
passage. Parmenides here explicates the program of 
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learning that he will develop over the remainder of 
the poem.  These lines should thus be considered as a 
summary, a meta-discourse on the poem12.  The poem 
will treat two topics successively.  The first topic is re-
lated with “truth” (let us accept this description for 
now), the treatment of which is evidenced by frag-
ments DK 2 to 8.59.  The second topic is to treat the 
opinions of mortals which is evidenced by DK 8.60 
to 19.  Let this inquiry proceed further by returning 
to examine the meaning of verse 1.29 closer: ἠμὲν 
Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ.
All scholars understand this verse metaphori-
cally, and translate according to the most common 
meaning of each word, letting the audience imagi-
nation get in action: the unshaken heart of the well-
rounded truth. All translations go in this direction, 
though with differences in style and variations in the 
Greek text provided by doxographers13, and do not 
turn away from the metaphorical meaning. Despite 
the very strong image of a “heart of the well-rounded 
truth”, which captured the interest of many scholars, 
there are many reasons to take this description as a 
novel and precise usage with a technical meaning, 
rather than a poetic metaphor. I studied these verses 
in details in a former work (Galgano, 2012) and here 
I just report some conclusions. 
The first point that we should consider is the 
abandonment at this juncture, and thereafter, of 
the poetic and mythical tone found in the first part 
of the proem14. The goddess’ speech throughout is 
instead quite technical and precise, without po-
etic and mythical language, very unlike the previ-
ous description of the kouros’s journey. Thus, the 
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‘unshaken heart of the well-rounded truth,’ as part 
of the goddess’ own speech, should be understood 
in that context. Thus, we should charitably assume 
that Parmenides’ usage of “unshaken hearth” to be a 
novel technical description and not a poetic meta-
phor.  Furthermore, it is clear that the goddess is 
speaking about two related and contrasting things, 
as evidenced by the correlatives ἠμὲν and ἠδὲ.  That 
there is not a metaphorical meaning implied in DK 
1.28 is further evidenced by how clearly the con-
trasting description in very next line—the opinions 
of mortals, in which there is no true trust—lacks 
any hint of metaphor.  
Not only are there good reasons to extend the 
technical language to all the goddess’ speech, there 
are good textual reason to reject more standard, 
“metaphorical” readings. First, an “unshaken heart” 
is an unlikely metaphor, for an “unshaken” heart is 
a dead heart15. Second, etymological considerations 
further recommend against any metaphorical mean-
ing. The word for ‘heart’ is ἦτορ, which from Homer 
to the lyric poets, was never used in a metaphorical 
sense16. The word for “truth,” aletheia (in genitive 
form, ἀληθείης) cannot be read as an abstract and 
ideal notion, because this meaning seems to take 
hold only much later on with Plato, and likely only 
fully realized as divine with Augustine17. At the time 
of Parmenides, it should be understood in the archa-
ic concrete meaning of ‘true thing’18. The expression 
‘well-rounded’ (εὐκυκλέος) has the Homeric mean-
ing of “well-tied protection”, as the structure of the 
shield of Agamemnon (Il. 11. 33)19. Even ἀτρεμὲς, 
an adjective meaning “still,” or “that which does not 
shake”, could be understood as “calm,” in an archaic 
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framework, such as “the sea that does not shake”20. 
However the meaning of “un-shaken,” which is what 
ἀ (privative) + τρεμὲς (trepid) means, suggests a 
sense of “not oscillating from side-to-side,” which 
will prove particularly important later on21. All these 
considerations lead us to reject attempts to view these 
lines with any metaphorical meaning, and to search 
for new ways of understanding them.  
Given this rejection of the metaphorical reading, 
we now face the problem of understanding what the 
technical meaning consists of.  We can conclude from 
these lines that the goddess is speaking of all (πάντα) 
knowledge about the world. On the one hand, the 
opinions of mortals, in which there is no true trust; 
and, on the other hand, trustful affirmations. What is 
at stake is the fact that some knowledge is trustful and 
some knowledge is not. To the knowledge in which 
there is no true trust, the goddess gives the name of 
‘opinion of mortals’, whereas to the trustful she gives 
the name of ‘well-rounded truth’. However, the ‘well-
rounded truth’ is in the genitive case.  Here, I propose 
taking it to be a genitive of origin (Smyth, 1956, p. 
441). In this case, something (ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ, accusa-
tive) originates from “well-rounded truth.”  With this 
in mind, and using the common, non-metaphorical 
meaning of ἦτορ — i.e. “seat of the reasoning power”, 
or “mind” in the modern sense—a new non-meta-
phorical and substantive meaning is revealed, and 
there is no longer any contradiction with the modi-
fier ἀτρεμὲς (“not trembling”), as minds do not move 
or “beat,” like hearts do. A “trembling mind” (i.e. one 
that “oscillates from side-to-side or back-and-forth”) 
is a mind in doubt.  A “still mind” (i.e. one which does 
not oscillate) is a mind firmly convinced, which has 
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overcome the alternating doubt between affirmation 
and negation of the same proposition. What is the 
cause (origin, genesis) of this firm and unshaken state 
of mind? It is the “well-rounded truth” itself, where 
‘well-rounded’ refers to the solid protection that 
keeps the parts tied, as in the case of Agamemnon’s 
shield— something that links all the elements to make 
a unique, solid and protected piece.22 
Now a very different sense of these lines is revealed: 
how the firm and steady mind results from a well-tied 
(well-connected) truth. Paraphrasing accordingly, 
this yields:
You will learn everything
both the firm mind originated by a well-connected (con-
vincing) truth
and the opinion of mortals, in which there is no convin-
cing truth.
Here we can see not only the psychological vocabu-
lary, but also a genuine psychological observation. On 
the one hand, there is a sort of mental conviction, or 
steadfast belief that can be trusted, is described as a 
phenomenon of the mind that does not tremble, does 
not oscillate from a side to the other, but stands up 
firm, united by its connections and bindings, and thus 
protected from doubt.  And it is on account of the 
“well-tied truth” which thus results in (“originates”) 
such a firm mind–i.e., the mind that does not change 
views with relation to the same object or subject.  In 
opposition to this trustworthy mental behavior, Par-
menides observes another phenomenon that the 
goddess calls the “opinions of mortals,” in which the 
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conviction (πίστις) is not true, because opinions (in 
respect of the same fact, subject, or object) changes 
and oscillates.  Those who suffer from this mental/
psychological state suffer from a lack of possession or 
familiarity with “well-tied truth.”  
Parmenides of course realizes that in both cases 
— whether subject to wandering opinions or firm 
conviction — the individual is convinced (or “per-
suaded,” as he will say some verses ahead) that he or 
she possesses true beliefs.  His point is that untrue 
conviction generates mere opinions, whereas the true 
conviction generates the firm mind.  This is a subtle 
yet very important distinction that must ground the 
beginning of any inquiry in reasoning: that though 
all humans may have the convictions of their beliefs, 
this does not mean that these beliefs are actually true. 
Having been persuaded into a belief does not make 
that belief true. 
Parmenides will say later that something more is 
required to get the certainty; it is necessary to follow 
a method which links together the elements of that 
knowledge, and in that way one obtains certain truth.
Parmenides’s insights into the nature of psycholog-
ical beliefs and their relation to truth allowed him to 
develop a novel method for inquiry and understand-
ing, resulting in several important early conclusions. 
If our convictions are not enough to certify the truth, 
this means at least two possible outcomes: 1) Either 
one, there is no adequate justification or epistemic 
certainty to our beliefs, and we can never have such; 
hence the possession of the truth is suspended, that 
pragmatically is the same as there being no truths; 
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2) Or, two, we must find a method by which to cer-
tify the truth and this means that we need to find the 
truth, i.e., a true certification that gives truth to that 
which it certifies. By recognizing and taking on this 
problem, Parmenides begins the process whereby one 
can know that they are not wise, because he does not 
know (for certain) the truth.  In other words, Par-
menides first introduces the problem for humanity to 
proceed on the quest for truth and wisdom.  Whereas 
his predecessors had merely searched for new knowl-
edge in various areas of inquiry, Parmenides realized 
there is a more fundamental issue to tackle first, re-
lated to the functions of human mind and the forma-
tion of belief:  that no knowledge could be considered 
true, and our convictions of it settled upon, until they 
correctly certified. Senses do not suffice, nor do sto-
ries and reports by authorities, nor appeal to tradi-
tion. All these possible grounds for possessing knowl-
edge are criticized exactly with this distinction—to 
be convinced of something is not sufficient to make 
that conviction true. At the same time, he begins the 
search for wisdom, starting from the awareness that 
we cannot immediately have the truth. In the follow-
ing section, I explicate how Parmenides continues to 
develop this important discovery, based upon his use 
of psychological language and observations.
Fragment 2
Fragment DK 2 is a masterpiece in many senses, and 
one of the most studied parts of the poem. However, 
the psychological perspective has not been adequately 
treated.  Though the bulk of the psychological vocabu-
lary is found in the first two verses, the whole fragment 
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is built on a fundamental psychological observation, 
which holds deep philosophical implications.
DK 28 B 2:  εἰ δ’ ἄγ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον 
ἀκούσας,
αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι·
ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,
Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος (Ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ),
ἡ δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι,
τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν·
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐὸν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν)
οὔτε φράσαις.
Here, the goddess says: “Now pay attention to my 
words, I will tell you the only paths of inquiry there 
are to think: one, that it is and that it is not possible 
not to be, is the path of Persuasion (for it accompanies 
the truth); the other, that is not and it is necessary not 
to be, this I declare to you is a totally inscrutable path, 
for you could not know what is not (for it cannot be 
accomplished) nor could you say it”. The interpretative 
views on this fragment vary widely, with the meaning 
of virtually every word open to question by scholars. 
However, here I can leave these philosophical views 
aside, focusing solely upon the psychological aspects.
The only paths of inquiry. DK B 2. 2. In the verse 2. 
2 – αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι – the god-
dess employs: 1) νοῆσαι, a verb discussed in further 
detail below; 2) ὁδοὶ, paths for the action of νοῆσαι; 
3) ὁδοὶ διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι, paths for a specific action 
of in a specific manner, that which inquires; 4) μοῦναι, 
referring to the fact that the paths she will show are 
the only possible paths apt to the inquiry. Each part/
Nicola S. Galgano, 
‘Parmenides as psy-
chologist – Part one: 
fragments DK 1 and 2’, 
p. 167-205
nº 19, jan.-apr. 2017
181
aspect of this verse refers to some psychological dis-
tinction, as explicated below.
1. νοῆσαι. The precise meaning of νοεῖν (from 
which νοῆσαι is derived) in Parmenides is con-
troversial. The controversy is largely based on 
the facts that: a) on one hand, Parmenides em-
ploys an epic poetical structure—i.e., the most 
traditional language and forms to express his 
thought, and b) simultaneously, on the other 
hand, he very likely needs to use old words in 
new ways to describe new discoveries, reflec-
tions and proposals.  Thus, the tension between 
old and the new usages, and determining which 
usage to impute where, provides many oppor-
tunities for ambiguity, and many real puzzles 
for scholars23. However, while other scholars 
have been concerned with the general meaning 
of νοεῖν in the whole poem, again I am focused 
on just this verse. 
Since von Fritz’s seminal article (Fritz, K. Von 
1945), there has been a tendency to explain the 
meaning of νοεῖv here in terms of its more an-
cient senses, particularly those found in Homer. 
Perhaps the intention behind this is to balance 
out a tendency by other scholars (even philos-
ophers—e.g. Heidegger) who take far too much 
liberty in the hermeneutical usages. While keep-
ing in mind the quite audacious interpretations 
from Hegelian historicism24 as well as the more 
sophisticated philological strategies (such as 
those offered by von Fritz), it seems fitting to 
proceed more cautiously and prudently here. 
Thus, I begin by ascribing a rather uncontroversial 
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meaning to the word νοῆσαι in this verse—that 
it refers to a behavior of mind. Given the fact 
that there are many kinds of mental activities, it 
remains to be determined exactly what sort of 
mental behavior Parmenides is referring to, and 
thus further examination of the text is required.
2. ὁδοὶ. This is the earliest psychological descrip-
tion of the fragment. The word means ‘paths’ 
and Parmenides speaks about a behavior of the 
mind, wherein the mind follows a particular 
path/course in a linear sequence of actions to-
wards a goal. Understanding this, it is clear that 
he is not talking about an isolated mental act, 
such as a singular perception or insight; rather, 
he is describing a process. 
3. διζήσιός. This modifier provides more speci-
ficity with respect to the sort of “path” Par-
menides seeks to describe25. It is some specific 
sort of process which aims at investigation and 
inquiry, posing questions and determining an-
swers. Parmenides has thus insightfully under-
stood that there are numerous types of mental 
activities.  Recognizing that some are singular 
activities, he also recognizes that at least one—
inquiry—is a sort of ongoing process. It is also 
now beginning to become clear that the mental 
process under discussion involves intentional 
action; for, in order for the process to result in 
a specific outcome—the possession of some 
knowledge—it is necessary to follow a par-
ticular pathway as part of the process. This is 
clinched by consideration of μοῦναι.
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4. μοῦναι. This term means ‘unique’ or, “only” (a 
feminine plural adjective, agreeing with ὁδοὶ, 
a feminine plural noun). The following lines 
make it clear that there are only two “paths of 
inquiry” under consideration in this fragment. 
What is really important here is the fact that 
Parmenides would have had to consider how 
many paths there could be, and why he con-
cluded that there are just two for inquiry. This 
again would have to be the result of his careful 
observations of mental behavior.  His though 
process can be imagined as follows: “there might 
be many possible paths to follow when engag-
ing in the mental activity of inquiry; however, 
after my examination, I have found just two of 
them are actually apt for this process.” This is a 
genuine observation of the behavior of mind, 
resulting from research and conclusions which 
were initiated by a general project, dedicated to 
realizing a specific aim.
5. νοῆσαι, again. Now, after the elucidation of 
the relevant terms, νοῆσαι can be fully defined 
and understood.  This form comes from νοέω, 
which according to the LSJ means: a) perceive 
by the mind, apprehend, take notice, perceive; 
b) think, consider, reflect; c) consider, deem, 
presume; d) other specific meanings in specific 
constructions.  Moreover, this LSJ entry explic-
itly quotes Parmenides’ DK B 8. 34 as a paradig-
matic example of meaning (a): “perceive by the 
mind.” However, in our language, ‘perception’ is 
an action of simultaneous sight; it is an isolated 
moment, even when referring to many actions 
of the mind. ‘Perception’ either refers to one 
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fact or, if referred to many actions of the mind, 
means that result obtained by a simultaneous 
sight. The same may be said of ‘thought’, which 
is just one event, even when it implies a se-
quence of arguments, since it refers to the result 
of arguing.  Many scholars translate ‘νοεῖν’ with 
‘think’ in Parmenides, following the seminal 
translation of Diels, ‘denken’. However, ‘think’ 
is problematic. It is very generic and can be em-
ployed for any mental activity: “perception”; to 
‘bring to memory, remember’; ‘search in memo-
ries’; ‘have an insight’; ‘think as in a brainstorm’. 
Thus, while this translation would not be wrong, 
it is surely less precise and ambiguous than this 
psychological study requires. Furthermore, the 
generic and ambiguous meaning of this transla-
tion generates conflicts and contradictions with 
other parts of the poem where there are other 
cognates of the verb νοεῖν. 
It is also common to translate νοῆσαι with the gen-
eral meaning of ‘knowledge’ and its synonyms, and 
this approach warrants consideration26. Von Fritz 
concludes that in Parmenides, though holding 
an ‘intuitive nature’ as in Heraclitus and the Ho-
meric poems, νοεῖν gains a new aspect—“for he 
was the first consciously to include logical rea-
soning in the function of the νόος.” (p. 241-2) 
While I can generally follow Von Fritz in this 
observation, I cannot make the same concession 
to those scholars who translate νοῆσαι as “for 
knowing,” as Kahn does27, arguing that: “The 
proper translation for the verb in Parmenides is 
a term like ‘cognition’ or ‘knowledge’: it is para-
phrased by γνῶναι, ‘to recognize, be acquainted 
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with,’ at 2. 7”28. The reason I cannot agree here is 
that, while knowledge is a function of the mind 
that could be the result of a logical reasoning, 
it could also be that which comes from an in-
tuition, or a ‘sixth sense’ (a perception neither 
clearly identified nor classified, but which in 
many cases works exactly where rational crite-
ria are exhausted, such as affective knowledge). 
As intuition (or “sixth-sense”) is an immediate 
sensation, and thus does not follow any process 
along a path (even less path of inquiry), this 
sort of intuitive knowledge is clearly in opposi-
tion to the meaning used by Parmenides.  
Moreover, “to know” even in the meaning of 
“logical knowledge” refers to a complete pro-
cess, which includes implying: who knows, the 
action of knowing and something known.  And, 
even when we say “knowing”, we mean ‘to em-
ploy the mind aiming at knowledge’ — thus, 
the expression again emphasizes the whole of 
the process, including primarily its result — 
the known. Once again, this fails to capture 
Parmenides’ intended meaning.  The poem, of 
course, is exactly about how the mind could 
reach its goal, which is the possession of true 
knowledge. However, the sort of knowledge 
Parmenides is concerned with must go beyond 
mere claims of possession of such.  Merely be-
lieving true knowledge is possessed, and having 
been persuaded to believe such, is insufficient. 
The quack and shaman who claim to know about 
medicine and the art of healing, the ruler who 
claims to possess knowledge about ruling, the 
priest who claims to possess knowledge about 
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the afterlife—they may all believe they possess 
genuine knowledge.  However, how could we 
know whether they were in fact in possession 
and knew what they claimed to know? The 
problem is that all these claims to “true knowl-
edge” could no longer suffice in Parmenides’ 
time, as cultural changes demanded further ex-
planations. Here Parmenides is not speaking of 
the result of knowing, ‘the known’, and this is 
clear by the expression ‘ὁδοὶ διζήσιός’, which 
cannot be applied either to that who knows or 
the known. Parmenides is speaking of the act 
of knowing, as a process of the inquiring mind, 
which instead can receive the qualification 
‘ὁδοὶ διζήσιός’. Hence, the use of ‘know’ is not 
possible for it drives to a misunderstanding of 
the meaning of the remainder poem29. 
There is another reason to avoid ‘knowledge, 
know’ for the translation of νοεῖν and its cog-
nates, which has been (unintentionally) recog-
nized by the same von Fritz. For if Parmenides 
is the first to employ the term ‘νοῆσαι’ with con-
notations related to ‘logical reasoning’, it is ex-
actly this new nuance which he would need to 
develop—i.e., how we can know something by 
using ‘logical reasoning’. In this case, the verb 
νοεῖν and its cognates could not be said to be 
employed in this new way by Parmenides on the 
grounds that that meaning was already found 
within and part of the semantics of that word. 
For it would be circular and anachronistic to 
have the semantics of a term hold a particular 
new meaning prior to the introduction of that 
meaning. Thus, unless Parmenides explicitly 
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signaled this new meaning and thus made his 
usage comprehensible to his audience, the usage 
of ‘know by logical reasoning’ could only be a 
consequence of Parmenidean philosophy, and 
not a justifiable premise for a new use by Par-
menides himself.  In other words, Parmenides 
here does not use the word in a novel way, but 
rather relies upon a specific aspect of its tradi-
tional meaning (i.e. mental activity), from which 
he tries to develop and define new sort of mental 
operation, which in the end will prove to be a 
sort of methodical mental process which, once 
discovered, νοεῖν could also refer to.
In light of these considerations, and in an at-
tempt to avoid the ambiguities that have arisen 
in the more traditional attempts at transla-
tion30, I prefer to employ here a very techni-
cal terminology.  While in doing so there may 
be some loss to the poetic aspects, clarity of 
the psychological elements in Parmenides’ 
language is gained. Therefore, I will exactly 
employ terminology that follows Parmenides’ 
description of the sort of mental activity he is 
concerned with—a path of inquiry, emphasiz-
ing: 1) the operation; 2) the path; 3) the process 
of inquiry (that is, the “inquisitive activity,” 
and not: a) the knowledge which is the result 
of all these elements,  nor b) the big umbrella 
category of ‘thought’ in general, under which 
almost any act of mind may be included). 
From this, I propose translating νοεῖν as “to 
engage in cognitive operations of the mind,” 
in the sense that ‘operations’ refers to those ac-
tions that lead towards knowledge, but are not 
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in-themselves the possession of knowledge (not 
a completed action of who knows-the act of 
knowing-the known). This phrase, “cognitive 
operations of the mind,” provides the precision 
needed for this inquiry, while simultaneously 
leaving aside the philosophical considerations 
irrelevant here.
With this in hand, the initial translation of DK 
2 can be revised, using the more technical lan-
guage for ‘νοεῖν’: “Now pay attention to my 
words, I will tell you the only paths of inqui-
ry there are for ‘the cognitive operations of the 
mind’ (νοῆσαι): one, that it is and that it is not 
possible not to be, is the path of Persuasion (for 
it accompanies the truth); the other, that it is 
not and it is necessary not to be, this I say that is 
a totally inscrutable path, for you cannot know 
what is not (for it cannot be accomplished) nor 
you could say it”.
DK B 2. 3-4. In the next verses, 3 and 4, Par-
menides explicates the first of the only two paths for 
inquiry. Verse 3 has a very uncommon syntactical 
construction, in that it lacks a grammatical subject; 
indeed, it is the only known case of this structure 
in all ancient Greek literature, and its interpretation 
has generated long and herd controversies. However, 
this unique structure need not be addressed, as I am 
solely focused on fleshing out the psychological vo-
cabulary in verse 4. Again, the lines can be initially 
translated as follows:
one, that it is and that it is not possible not to be,
it is path of Persuasion (for it accompanies the truth);
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Parmenides says that the first path (to think that 
it is and that it is not possible not to be) is a path of 
persuasion. Yet he does not mean just any sort of 
“persuasion,” here, but rather a special sort of per-
suasion that accompanies (ὀπηδεῖ) the truth. Back at 
DK 1. 29-30, Parmenides established the difference 
between true and untrue persuasion.  Persuasion is 
foremost a path, i.e. a set of proposition that induces 
someone to accept an understanding. However, one 
can be also persuaded of untrue affirmations.  There-
fore, here Parmenides goes further, identifying an 
essential element to the sort of genuine persuasion 
he is concerned with developing.  Parmenides here 
is explaining what the path of thoughts – now we 
are sure that νοῆσαι refers to thoughts, for it is al-
most impossible to get a path of images, insights and 
perceptions, which by their nature are instantaneous 
and cannot be extended in a path with connections 
between each one of them – that accompanies the 
truth (in opposition to the path that runs without 
truth), is. In short, the path by which ‘it is and it is 
impossible not to be’.
DK B 2. 5-6. Verses 5-6 are symmetrical to 3-4. So, 
as in 3, verse 5 has the goddess describe the second 
path for inquiry, and qualifies it in verse 6:
the other, that it is not and it is necessary not to be,
this I say is a totally inscrutable path,
These words are incomprehensible to many scholars. 
First, what could ‘it is necessary not to be’ mean? 
And, if the second path involves ‘it is not’, why might 
the goddess say that it “is a totally inscrutable path”? 
Nicola S. Galgano, 
‘Parmenides as psy-
chologist – Part one: 
fragments DK 1 and 2’, 
p. 167-205
190
nº 19, jan.-apr. 2017
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to 
look forward to verses 7-8: 
for you could not know what is not (for it cannot be 
accomplished)
nor could you say it
Though still mysterious, the entire description of the 
second path has now been laid out, and the argument 
can be followed and analyzed step by step. This is best 
accomplished beginning at the end, with verse 7 and 
the verb γνοίης, an optative of γιγνώσκω. This verb 
refers to an activity of mind, the activity of knowing, 
and is thus firmly ensconced within the field of psy-
chology.  Parmenides is thus claiming that we cannot 
know what is not. In terms of logic, this seems rea-
sonable; for how could I know something that is not? 
But Parmenides was (we would say in current terms) a 
philosopher (i.e., a sophisticated thinker), and this kind 
of simple logical knowledge would be too trivial to him. 
For, of course, even though we may not have consciously 
considered it, we are immediately aware that is impos-
sible to know what is not when the possibility is con-
sidered—for, how can there be any knowledge in the 
absence of any object for knowing? Thus, it is likely 
Parmenides wanted to say something more than just 
what is easily accepted by common sense.
The expression τό μὴ ἐὸν literally means ‘the being 
that is not’. In ancient Greek as in our current lan-
guage (and in our logic of language), negation can 
only negate a positive affirmation (even in the case of 
double negation, where the first negation is the nega-
tion of the affirmation of the second negation). There 
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can simply be no pure negation, only negation in con-
junction with affirmation.  Therefore, to Parmenides 
and to us, ‘the being that is not’ means ‘the being that 
is being negated’. This is also the common meaning 
of our linguistic negation. If I say “not this, but that,” 
I mean that there is a “this” that I negate, in contrast 
to a “that” which I affirm. Therefore, in our common 
negation, there is always an implied something being 
negated. Understanding the affirmative ἐὸν of the 
expression ‘τό μὴ ἐὸν’ in a very generic manner — 
i.e. all beings (that πάντα of the verse 1.28) , the 
Parmenidean negation makes sense. It is impossible 
to know (to accomplish that mental act that we call 
knowing) that which is the negation of all beings. 
This may take some further analysis to understand 
beyond the common sense negation considered 
above. Consider the following explication, which 
though the process may not be exactly the same that 
Parmenides followed for his understanding, leads to 
the same conclusion. Using reflective imagination, 
begin by negating one object. For instance, I have 
a book on my desk and I can imagine its annihila-
tion, a non-book, i.e. a desk without the book. I can 
then expand this, and imagine my house without my 
desk, the city without my house, the planet without 
my city, the physical world without my planet, and 
even the negation of the whole world (i.e. all other 
intelligible beings). Finally, after negating everything 
outside me, if I want to negate literally everything, I 
need to negate myself.  If I am to negate myself, that 
must include negating my cognitive capacity, which 
is what is aware that I have so far negated everything 
except myself in terms of my own cognitive capacity. 
What happens at this moment is the possibility of 
alternatively following two paths:
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1. First, my cognitive capacity negates itself, and I 
am aware that my cognitive capacity negates it-
self. That means that this last negation generated 
a new cognitive subject, which is aware that the 
former cognitive capacity was negated. Now, 
the new cognitive subject, with the new cog-
nitive capacity, negates itself and, doing this, 
generates a new cognitive subject and so on ad 
infinitum. Hence, it is impossible to know the 
negation of all beings, for the act of negation 
is an affirmation (it is the affirmation of the act 
of negation) and the negation of everything al-
ways implies at least the affirmation of the act 
of negation. This process cannot be driven to-
tally to the end, it goes on ad infinitum, cannot 
be accomplished (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν). Of course, 
something that does not happen (to know what 
is not) cannot be pointed out, indicated or said 
(οὔτε φράσαις).
2. Second, my cognitive capacity negates itself, 
while lacking the awareness that it has itself 
been negated. This would require that my cog-
nitive capacity suffers a blackout, a complete 
failure in, and cessation of all cognitive pro-
cesses. As a result, the possibility for negation 
vanishes, for the absence of support of any cog-
nitive action makes negation impossible in this 
case too, I cannot point out, know, and say the 
negation of all things.
Similarly, verses 7-8 are describing the cognitive 
impossibility of negating all beings. Therefore, when 
we think ‘what is not’, we make a start at a process 
that cannot be completed. Either ‘what is’ makes itself 
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present again and cannot be negated, or the path abrupt-
ly breaks off as a consequence of total cognitive absence. 
These further qualifications of verses 7-8 can now 
be considered in relation to the entire fragment. 
Back in DK 3-4, the goddess says that the first path 
for inquiry is: “that it is and that it is not possible not 
to be. The interesting part of this affirmation is that 
the path “that is” is simultaneously a path in which 
‘it is impossible not to be’. In my example reconstruc-
tion of the meditation that attempts to know ‘what 
is not’ (τό μὴ ἐὸν), it was determined in the first at-
tempt that it is impossible to think the negation of all 
beings; for something always remains which is not pos-
sible to be negated.  Hence, it is not possible not to be. 
Moreover, when the goddess says that the second path 
is ‘that it is not and that it is necessary not to be,’ this cor-
responds to the second attempt in my example, whereby 
the complete negation of all things includes the nega-
tion of cognitive thinking, and thus the elimination of 
the necessary apparatus for knowing anything. This 
is why verse 6 literally says: ‘I tell you that this is a 
path not totally scrutable’—i.e.: you can negate almost 
everything but not everything, not entirely, not totally 
(παναπευθέα).
Therefore, when we try to think τό μὴ ἐὸν, we con-
clude that we could think just that ‘it is’ or that ‘what 
is not is impossible’ and who believes that would be 
possible is in error. Of the two paths, the second is 
a chimera—though we may initially have the naïve 
idea that we can negate everything, a little investiga-
tion through trying quickly demonstrates this to be 
impossible. In contrast, the first path is a genuine path 
which we can follow, for ‘it is’ cannot be absolutely 
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negated.  This is a truth of our thinking and it is path 
of that Persuasion that goes in the company of truth, 
because its negation is impossible.
In this meditation, we find the nucleus of Parmeni-
dean philosophy, which regrettably I cannot examine 
here further. However, I think it should be clear that 
Parmenides carefully devoted himself to the study of 
the behavior of the mind, from which he discovered 
a process of persuasion which leads to firm (without 
doubt) knowledge for our minds — i.e., the sort of 
thoughts that cannot be otherwise, a firmness (cer-
tainty) of the mind that allows the true understanding 
of reality. 
Notes
1   I would like to thank Jeremy Delong for his precious 
corrections on my English version of this paper, originally in 
Portuguese.
2   A remarkable exception in the book of Beare, 1906, Greek 
theories of elementary cognition. From Alcmaeon to Aristotle”. 
Curiously, Parmenides is not treated.
3   Being limited to the search of a psychological vocabulary, 
this study does not strictly depend on either any interpretation of 
the poem as a whole or the ordination of the fragments; for this 
reason, I use the traditional edition and ordination of Diels-Kranz.
4   Among the many interpretations of the kouros (in Greek, 
young), in general polarized between identify him with Par-
menides himself and one of his disciple, we have the position 
of Cosgrove (1974), who says that kouros means young, in the 
meaning of ‘without experience’ (“Youth, on the other hand, 
implies inexperience”, p. 93), so he could be an adult and mature 
man and even be a kouros.
5   Zeller (1961) does not take the proem in account, whereas 
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Diels (1897) validates it again, analyzing the descriptive details of 
axes, bolts and other mechanisms present in the proem. Bowra 
returns, in certain way, to the interpretation of Sextus, saying 
that the proem is essentially allegoric. At the same time, a new 
mystical interpretation, somehow already found in Diels, starts 
with the analysis of Burkert (1969) and continues with Kingsley 
(1999 and 2003) until achieving the sensorial interpretation of 
Gemelli-Marciano (2008).
6   For Sextus (S. E. M. 7. 112-114), mares are the desire of 
the soul (τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρμάς), the path of daimon is the philo-
sophical argument (τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον θεωρίαν) and so on.
7   Bremmer (1983, p.54): “Thymos is above all, the source of 
emotions”.
8   Bremmer (1983, p.55): “When Odysseus is left alone by 
the Greeks in a battle, “he spoke to his proud thymos” (XI, 403). 
Having realized the two possibilities left to him, he ends his de-
liberations by asking, “but why does my Thymos consider that?” 
(XI, 407)”
9   “Multimedia”, in the felicitous expression of Cornelli 
(2007, p.50).
10   A good discussion about the techniques that Parmenides 
uses for his audience is in Robbiano (2006). Despite the great 
discussion about the role of the proem, still there is no clear nexus 
between the its contents and the rest of the poem.
11   Scholars translate in many diferent way: Albertelli (1939, 
p. 119) che tu impari; Pasquinelli (1958, p.227): imparare; Guthrie 
(1965, p.9) to learn; Capizzi (1975, p. 8) esplorare; Barnes (1982, 
p.122): ascertain; O’Brien (1987, p.7) hear; Marques (1990, p.114), 
Santoro (2011, p.85): que te instruas; Reale (1991, p.89): che tu 
apprenda; Conche (2004, p. 43) que tu sois instruit; Robbiano 
(2006, p. 213): to find out; Coxon (2009, p.52) be informed.
12   See the excellent article of Livio Rossetti, La structure du 
poème de Parménide (2010).
13   The term εὐκυκλέος, transmitted by Simplicius, is chosen 
by Diels, but many authors prefer one of the two variants that 
we have: εὐπειθέος, from Sextus Empiricus and εὐφεγγέος, from 
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Proclus. The term ἀτρεμὲς has a variant, ἀτρεκὲς, in Plutarch. 
Recently, Kurfess defended an interesting interpretative ques-
tion; in the archaic poetry there is a tendency to repetition that, 
in the case of Parmenides, was underestimated; then the three 
adjectives are not variants of the same verse but should belong 
to three different verses, implying the necessity of introducing 
two more fragments: “What are commonly regarded as conflict-
ing variant readings of the opening of the poem are actually, so 
I claim, quotations from different passages of the poem, and 
all three adjectives, εὐκυκλέος, εὐπειθέος and even εὐφεγγέος, 
preserve Parmenides’ original wording” (Kurfess, 2014a).
14   Rossetti (2010, p.202): “En annonçant les deux types de 
savoir, la déesse entre dans le rôle du sophos et du didaskalos, 
cependant que le poète Parménide abandonne celui du chanteur 
qui cherche à enchanter et suggestionner son auditoire pour celui 
de l’intellectuel qui a appris et sait des choses retentissantes et qui 
est capable d’en rendre compte.”
15   Alone among scholars, Gemelli-Marciano considers the 
whole expression as a metaphor, in a curious explanation – too 
forced, in my opinion, thus not tenable - where the still heart is 
actually a ‘dead heart’: Questa immagine è una sorta di ossimoro: 
un cuore per definizione  palpita,  un  cuore  immobile  è  quello 
di  un  corpo  morto.  L’espressione […] rimanda  alla  pratica 
dell’hēsychia di cui parla Diogene Laerzio.” (Gemelli Marciano, 
2013, p.82)
16   Sullivan (1996). In a passage of her paper (p. 17), the 
author suggests – quoting Il. X 93, where a very concerned 
Agamemnon says “my ἦτορ is not firm (ἔμπεδον) – that what is 
‘not firm’ could refer to the beat of the heart, maybe irregular, 
characterizing a meaning more physical. I believe that is much 
simpler to accept the psychological sense for many reasons: 1) a 
notion of variation in the regularity of the pulse-beat associated 
with concerns of Agamemnon seems to me a too much sophis-
ticated conception for that time; 2) the ‘not firm’ clearly refers 
to an indecision of Agammnon, who goes in search for the help 
of Nestor, the wisest of Achaios; 3) Homer uses ἔμπεδον some 
other times as adjective for φρένες and νόος (Il. 6. 532 and 11. 
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813), expressions with clear psychological reference.
17   In “De libero arbitrio” Augustine equates the Truth and God.
18   Bernabé associates the term ἀλήθεια in Parmenides to 
the magic mystical formulas of Orphic matrix used in Southern 
Italy at that time. In this formulas ἀλήθεια means something that 
should not be forgotten (according to the etymological notion of 
the word), should be kept in mind: “No universo das lâminas, a 
verdade não é outra coisa senão aquilo que não se deve esquecer, 
o que foi aprendido na iniciação.” (Bernabé, 2013, p. 51). In other 
words, ἀλήθεια presents a notion of mental process of the subject 
who thinks, and not something objective, out of the mind of the 
subject, as would be in the case of an ideal and absolute truth.
19   The term κύκλος has the meaning of ‘ring of protection’ 
that keeps strongly linked all pieces of the Agamemnon’s shield 
(ἣν πέρι μὲν κύκλοι δέκα χάλκεοι ἦσαν, rounded by ten rings of 
bronze).
20   LSJ, entry ἀτρεμὴς, Semonides, 7.37: “θάλασσα ... 
ἀτρεμὴς”.
21   If it is true that τρέμω and its cognates may refer to a 
shake of fear, it is also true that it may refer to the mere physical 
movement, without any emotional implication, as an earthquake 
(Il. 13. 18) or the tremble of hiccough (Il. 21. 507); in the case of 
lack of movement the tremble does not refer just to the calm (of 
the courage) but also to the stillness, as the peak of a mountain 
(Il. 5. 524) or a stele or a big tree (Il. 13. 438) or even the non-rest 
of a spear in full activity (Il. 13. 557).
22   Diels chose εὐκυκλέος for it is a lectio difficilior. ‘Well-
persuasive’, the variant brought by Sextus Empiricus, displays 
more clearly the psychological content of the expression ἀτρεμὲς 
ἦτορ, and this reinforces the interpretation presented here. Here, 
in a context of philosophical interpretation, both εὐκυκλέος 
and εὐπειθέος have a convergent meaning and our task can be 
considered as accomplished using one or the other. However, in 
a philological context studies are ongoing; for example, Passa 
believes that εὐκυκλέος is secondary adjustment, which tends to 
transfer in the programmatic verse of the proem the fundamental 
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contents of neoplatonic tradition (Passa, 2009, p.52); Kurfess is 
even more daring and defends the possibility that the three vari-
ants εὐκυκλέος, εὐπειθέος, εὐφεγγέος belong to three different 
verses of the poem (Kurfess, 2012, p.18-54).
23   Tarán (1965) translates: “which are the only ways of 
inquiry that you can be conceived” (p.32); Ramnoux (1979): 
“quelle sont les seules voies de recherche à concevoir?” (p. 110); 
Untersteiner (1979): “quali sole vie di ricerca siano logicamente 
pensabili” (p.129); Barnes (1982): “what are the only roads of 
inquiry for thinking of” (p. 124); O’Brien (1987): “just what ways 
of enquiry there are, the only ones that can be thought of.” (p.16); 
Cerri (1999): “quelle che sono le sole due vie di ricerca pensabili” 
(p. 149); Cordero (2005): “cuales son los únicos caminos de in-
vestigacion que hay para pensar” (p. 219); Coxon (2009): “about 
those ways of enquiry which are alone conceivable” (p. 56).
24   See, for example, Hosle, 1984.
25   Δίζησις, from δίζημαι, seek out, look for among many (LSJ), 
does not appear before Parmenides and likely it is his invention. 
Untersteiner notes the nuance of indecision and, using Herodo-
tus VII.142, 1, as example, says:  “δίζησις could be the search in 
face of a problem that admits two opposite solutions” (1979, p. 
LXXXI, n. 119).
26   There is salso that who does not translate νοῆσαι, as Colli, 
who offers: “Suvvia, io ti dirò […] quali sono le uniche vie di 
ricerca: la prima... etc.” (2003, p. 137).
27   Kahn (2009, p.146, n.4): “I take νοῆσαι as loosely exegeti-
cal, or final, with ὁδοί, ‘what ways of search there are for knowing’; 
i.e. I do not construe the infinitive as potential with εἰσί, which 
gives the usual translation: ‘the only ways of search that can be 
thought of’. This usual construction provides us with a gratuitous 
contradiction, since Parmenides goes on to show that the second 
way is after all ἀνόητος (8. 17; cf. 2. 7).”
28   Ibidem: “The proper translation for the verb in Par-
menides is a term like ‘cognition’ or ‘knowledge’: it is paraphrased 
by γνῶναι, ‘to recognize, be acquainted with,’ at 2.7.”
29   This is what happens to Kahn, who finally portrays a 
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distorted picture of the philosophical message of the poem. (cf. 
Galgano, 2012)
30   There is also another set of interpretations, negligible 
in our methodology, which intend to relate noein and to eon, 
trying to get semantics of one from the other and vice-versa: 
Sedley, (2000, p.120); Crystal (2002); Lesher (1994, especially 
p.24-34).
 The complete justification to take the ἐὸν. Literally the being, 
as analogous to πάντα of 1. 28 cannot be given here, for it requires 
a complex argument in a completely different methodology. 
Suffice here the generic argument that Parmenides is talking 
about absolute ἐὸν, which is a fact confirmed by the platonic 
criticism that against the Eleatic introduces the relative being. 
‘All beings’ is an absolute notion, for there is nothing beyond it 
with which it could be stablished a relation.
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